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Maintained by Francis F. Steen, Communication Studies, University of California Los Angeles |
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Preface
List of contributors
Introduction. David R. Olson, Janet W. Astington and Paul L. Harris
Part I: Developmental origins of children's knowledge about the mind
Leslie, Alan M. Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child's theory of mind. 19-46.
Abstract: pretense and false belief; calculating alternative models. Pretense from a mechanistic point of view. Understanding false belief: linking meta-representations with causality. When development goes wrong: childhood autism. The meta-representational approach.
Abstract: the present chapter is an antidote to the theory metaphor; the point is that young children do not really have anything like a theory; the guiding heuristic is that the seemingly theoretical characteristics of children's understanding of human action can be explained in terms of concrete, non-theorylike mechanisms... the structure of experience... conscious experience... other minds
Abstract: focus on the early development of explicit knowledge of the mind in
2 1/2- and 3-year-olds... claim that this represents first achievement of a theory
of mind, albeit an achievement with clear antecedents in earlier abilities...
explore the notion of theory involved in the phrase "theory of mind"... can very
young children legitimately be said to have theories and specifically theories
of mind
Abstract: in the present studies we explored children's understanding of how the factors of distance, occlusion, and intensity of the stimulus (size or loudness) might affect vision, audition, smell, and touch... argued that the previous work as well as our present study support the conclusion that by 2 1/2 to 3, young children are indeed capable of thinking about others' mental processes, and that they have rudimentary theories about perception
Abstract: considers the evidence for the concept of intentionality in infancy and early childhood and its origin in the concept of agency... summarizes recent efforts to examine the child's knowledge of intention per se and the inference rules that children use in judging the intentionality of action outcomes... the concept of intentionality in very young children viewed through the window of language and pretend play is considered... development of the concept of intention
Abstract: making mental objects... recursion... Emmy at 2 to 3 years: from topicalization to recursion... from recursion to thoughts about thoughts
Abstract: this chapter describes children's acquisition of a "theory of mind" in terms of their growing ability to understand the semantics of mental states... three levels of semantic awareness... mental states and behavior
Abstract: propose that in the development of children's conception of mental life two broad stages should be distinguished... it is argued that the attribution of a false belief to another person can be interpreted as another manifestation of children's understanding of information conditions... some speculations are presented about how an understanding of informational origins might be acquired... understanding perception and communication as origins of knowledge... understanding inference as origin of knowledge... false beliefs... the appearance-reality distinction
Abstract: children's understanding of representational change; experiment 1; experiment 2... explanation of the findings... relation to other metacognitive abilities... theoretical implications... general implications
Abstract: the research discussed in this chapter investigated children's tendency to confuse seeing and knowing, that is, to conflate information that is known about an object or event with present perceptual information available to all observers... empirical evidence supporting the seeing=knowing hypothesis... the bias against multiple interpretations of the same information
Abstract: the commonsense view of the world... cognitive abilities underlying common sense... the origins of common sense... the development of the representational model of the mind... general implications of this view for child development
Abstract: the theory... evidence for the theory... developmental synchronies and asynchronies... explaining the transition from connections to representations
Abstract: discuss methods of assessing children's ability to attribute second-order mental states... illustrate how these methods can be used for assessing children's ability to discriminate between different kinds of social interaction, using three examples from work by my colleagues at Sussex... experimental isolation of first- and second-order state representations... social interaction and mental states
Abstract: new findings... discovering that beliefs about emotion can be false... distinguishing reality from appearance... a mentalistic theory of emotion... understanding deception
Abstract: the child must . . . discover that other people have minds; part of the child's developing theory of mind must therefore include the awareness that the knowledge, thoughts, and beliefs of others also depend on the information made available to them, and that their knowledge might at times be different from that possessed by the child; he or she must rely on the process of communication to discover what others know, believe, and desire and to convey information to them... message evaluation; message revision... "messages to the self"... messages and the theory of mind
Abstract: shows that children who are told that speakers may have more than one intention find it easier to detect ambiguity in a message... sees attention to the words of a message as a skill that may be tied to literacy
Abstract: presents a computational model, JIA, that judges the intentionality of actions; the basic architecture of the model is explained, as is the knowledge representation scheme that it uses; the main features of the model are discussed in greater detail, and results for some sample problems are presented... limitations of the present program and likely future improvements are outlined, as are the advantages of both this particular project and the general strategy of implementing computational models of reasoning
Abstract: consider the relation between two sets of considerations; I shall discuss four necessary conditions for distinguishing mental from nonmental entities; I shall examine how children at different ages make judgments about mental entities and about these enduring objects, my general goal being to explain children's judgments by appeal to their understanding of the necessary conditions for distinguishing mental from physical objects... the agentive condition; the failure condition; the asymmetry condition; the perceptual field condition
Abstract: what is a theory of mind; the consensus view... when do "theories of mind" first come into evidence... are all true theories of mind constructivistic theories of mind... are all theories of mind constructivistic theories of mind... constructivistic versus quasi-constructivistic theories of mind
Abstract: it is my purpose in this chapter to sketch one way in which the careful experimental study of children's understanding of intentional or mental states may help us thread a developmental course between the behaviorists, who eschew mental states, and the intentionalists, who espouse them... representational theories of mind... children's intentional states
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Maintained by Francis F. Steen, Communication Studies, University of California Los Angeles |
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