Janet W. Astington, Paul L. Harris, David R. Olson (eds.)
Developing Theories of Mind
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988
 
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Abstract
 
Developing Theories of Mind is a unique collection of empirical reports and conceptual analyses written by leading researchers in an exciting new area of the cognitive sciences: children's developing theories of mind. It springs from the Workshop on Children's Early Concept of Mind at Oxford in England in June 1986. The result is much more than a set of conference proceedings: it is a coherent, sustained attack on a set of fundamental issues in developmental psychology and cognitive science. The book examines a fundamental change that occurs in children's cognition between the ages of two and six. During these years children show a new understanding of perception, action, and talk that indicates a new sensitivity to the life of the mind. Children begin to make a systematic distinction between the world and mental representations of the world. They can then pretend and understand pretense in others. They can predict and explain actions by considering people's beliefs and desires. They can distinguish between appearance and reality, and between utterance and intention. They can understand how knowledge is acquired. Indeed, the achievements occur in so many apparently unrelated domains that one may say children's new understanding of the mind constitutes a new stage of intellectual development. The volume is a state-of-the-art report on the conceptual and empirical advances being made in this important new area of research.
 
Contents  top

Preface
List of contributors
Introduction. David R. Olson, Janet W. Astington and Paul L. Harris

Part I: Developmental origins of children's knowledge about the mind

  1. Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child's theory of mind. Alan M. Leslie
  2. Theory of mind and the structure of conscious experience. Carl Nils Johnson
  3. First steps in the child's theorizing about the mind. Henry M. Wellman
  4. Children's understanding of perceptibility. Ilan Yaniv and Marilyn Shatz
  5. The development of the understanding of human behavior: From agency to intentionality. Diane Poulin-Dubois and Thomas R. Shultz
  6. Early forms of thought about thoughts: Some simple linguistic expressions of mental state. Carol Fleisher Feldman
Part I: Coordinating representational states with the world:
Understanding the relationships among perception, knowledge, and reality
  1. Developing semantics for theories of mind: From propositional attitudes to mental representation. Josef Perner
  2. A second stage in children's conception of mental life: Understanding informational accesses as origins of knowledge and belief. Heinz Wimmer, Juergen Hogrefe and Beate Sodian
  3. Knowing you've changed your mind: Children's understanding of representational change. Janet W. Astington and Alison Gopnik
  4. The development of children's understanding of the seeing-knowing distinction. Marjorie Taylor
  5. The ontogeny of common sense. Lynd Forguson and Alison Gopnik
  6. The development of children's knowledge about the mind: From cognitive connections to mental representations. John H. Flavell
Part III: Further development of a theory of mind:
Understanding mental states in social interaction and communication
  1. Higher-order beliefs and intentions in children's understanding of social interaction. Josef Perner
  2. Children's understanding of real and apparent emotion. Paul L. Harris and Dana Gross
  3. Children's knowledge about representations of intended meaning. Carole R. Beal
  4. What is said and what is meant in referential communication. Gary Bonitatibus
Part IV: Further theoretical implications of children's concepts of mind 
  1. Assessing intention: A computational model. Thomas R. Shultz
  2. Making judgments about thoughts and things. James Russell
  3. Doubt and developing theories of mind. Michael Chandler
  4. On the origins of beliefs and other intentional states in children. David R. Olson
Name index
Subject index


 
Chapter Abstracts

Leslie, Alan M. Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child's theory of mind. 19-46.

Abstract: pretense and false belief; calculating alternative models. Pretense from a mechanistic point of view. Understanding false belief: linking meta-representations with causality. When development goes wrong: childhood autism. The meta-representational approach.

 
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Johnson, Carl Nils. Theory of mind and the structure of conscious experience. IN: Developing theories of mind. 47-63.

Abstract: the present chapter is an antidote to the theory metaphor; the point is that young children do not really have anything like a theory; the guiding heuristic is that the seemingly theoretical characteristics of children's understanding of human action can be explained in terms of concrete, non-theorylike mechanisms... the structure of experience... conscious experience... other minds

 
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Wellman, Henry M. First steps in the child's theorizing about the mind. 64-92.

Abstract: focus on the early development of explicit knowledge of the mind in 2 1/2- and 3-year-olds... claim that this represents first achievement of a theory of mind, albeit an achievement with clear antecedents in earlier abilities... explore the notion of theory involved in the phrase "theory of mind"... can very young children legitimately be said to have theories and specifically theories of mind
 

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Yaniv, Ilan and Marily Shatz. Children's understanding of perceptibility. 93-108.

Abstract: in the present studies we explored children's understanding of how the factors of distance, occlusion, and intensity of the stimulus (size or loudness) might affect vision, audition, smell, and touch... argued that the previous work as well as our present study support the conclusion that by 2 1/2 to 3, young children are indeed capable of thinking about others' mental processes, and that they have rudimentary theories about perception

 
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Poulin-Dubois, Diane and Thomas R. Shultz. The development of the understanding of human behavior: From agency to intentionality. 109-125.

Abstract: considers the evidence for the concept of intentionality in infancy and early childhood and its origin in the concept of agency... summarizes recent efforts to examine the child's knowledge of intention per se and the inference rules that children use in judging the intentionality of action outcomes... the concept of intentionality in very young children viewed through the window of language and pretend play is considered... development of the concept of intention

 
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Feldman, Carol Fleisher. Early forms of thought about thoughts: Some simple linguistic expressions of mental state. 126-137.

Abstract: making mental objects... recursion... Emmy at 2 to 3 years: from topicalization to recursion... from recursion to thoughts about thoughts

 
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Perner, Josef. Developing semantics for theories of mind: From propositional attitudes to mental representation. 141-172.

Abstract: this chapter describes children's acquisition of a "theory of mind" in terms of their growing ability to understand the semantics of mental states... three levels of semantic awareness... mental states and behavior

 
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Wimmer, Heinz, Juergen Hogrefe, and Beate Sodian. A second stage in children's conception of mental life: Understanding informational accesses as origins of knowledge and belief. 173-192.

Abstract: propose that in the development of children's conception of mental life two broad stages should be distinguished... it is argued that the attribution of a false belief to another person can be interpreted as another manifestation of children's understanding of information conditions... some speculations are presented about how an understanding of informational origins might be acquired... understanding perception and communication as origins of knowledge... understanding inference as origin of knowledge... false beliefs... the appearance-reality distinction

 
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Astington, Janet W. and Alison Gopnik. Knowing you've changed your mind: Children's understanding of representational change. 193-206.

Abstract: children's understanding of representational change; experiment 1; experiment 2... explanation of the findings... relation to other metacognitive abilities... theoretical implications... general implications

 
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Taylor, Marjorie. The development of children's understanding of the seeing-knowing distinction. IN: Developing theories of mind. Janet W. Astington, Ed; Paul L. Harris, Ed; et al. (International Conference on Developing Theories of Mind, May, 1986, Toronto, ON, Canada) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England UK. 1988.207-225.

Abstract: the research discussed in this chapter investigated children's tendency to confuse seeing and knowing, that is, to conflate information that is known about an object or event with present perceptual information available to all observers... empirical evidence supporting the seeing=knowing hypothesis... the bias against multiple interpretations of the same information

 
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Forguson, Lynd and Alison Gopnik. The ontogeny of common sense. 226-243.

Abstract: the commonsense view of the world... cognitive abilities underlying common sense... the origins of common sense... the development of the representational model of the mind... general implications of this view for child development

 
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Flavell, John H. The development of children's knowledge about the mind: From cognitive connections to mental representations. 244-267.

Abstract: the theory... evidence for the theory... developmental synchronies and asynchronies... explaining the transition from connections to representations

 
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Perner, Josef. Higher-order beliefs and intentions in children's understanding of social interaction. 271-294.

Abstract: discuss methods of assessing children's ability to attribute second-order mental states... illustrate how these methods can be used for assessing children's ability to discriminate between different kinds of social interaction, using three examples from work by my colleagues at Sussex... experimental isolation of first- and second-order state representations... social interaction and mental states

 
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Harris, Paul L. and Dana Gross. Children's understanding of real and apparent emotion. 295-314.

Abstract: new findings... discovering that beliefs about emotion can be false... distinguishing reality from appearance... a mentalistic theory of emotion... understanding deception

 
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Beal, Carole R. Children's knowledge about representations of intended meaning. 315-325.

Abstract: the child must . . . discover that other people have minds; part of the child's developing theory of mind must therefore include the awareness that the knowledge, thoughts, and beliefs of others also depend on the information made available to them, and that their knowledge might at times be different from that possessed by the child; he or she must rely on the process of communication to discover what others know, believe, and desire and to convey information to them... message evaluation; message revision... "messages to the self"... messages and the theory of mind

 
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Bonitatibus, Gary. What is said and what is meant in referential communication. 326-338.

Abstract: shows that children who are told that speakers may have more than one intention find it easier to detect ambiguity in a message... sees attention to the words of a message as a skill that may be tied to literacy

 
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Shultz, Thomas R. Assessing intention: A computational model. 341-367.

Abstract: presents a computational model, JIA, that judges the intentionality of actions; the basic architecture of the model is explained, as is the knowledge representation scheme that it uses; the main features of the model are discussed in greater detail, and results for some sample problems are presented... limitations of the present program and likely future improvements are outlined, as are the advantages of both this particular project and the general strategy of implementing computational models of reasoning

 
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Russell, James. Making judgments about thoughts and things. 368-386.

Abstract: consider the relation between two sets of considerations; I shall discuss four necessary conditions for distinguishing mental from nonmental entities; I shall examine how children at different ages make judgments about mental entities and about these enduring objects, my general goal being to explain children's judgments by appeal to their understanding of the necessary conditions for distinguishing mental from physical objects... the agentive condition; the failure condition; the asymmetry condition; the perceptual field condition

 
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Chandler, Michael. Doubt and developing theories of mind. 387-413.

Abstract: what is a theory of mind; the consensus view... when do "theories of mind" first come into evidence... are all true theories of mind constructivistic theories of mind... are all theories of mind constructivistic theories of mind... constructivistic versus quasi-constructivistic theories of mind

 
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Olson, David R. On the origins of beliefs and other intentional states in children. 414-426.

Abstract: it is my purpose in this chapter to sketch one way in which the careful experimental study of children's understanding of intentional or mental states may help us thread a developmental course between the behaviorists, who eschew mental states, and the intentionalists, who espouse them... representational theories of mind... children's intentional states

 

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