Force Dynamics
The faculty of construing the world in terms of
entities interacting through force
(Last updated December 7, 1996)
The main paper on this faculty from a linguistic approach is Leonard Talmy's
"Force Dynamics in Language and
Cognition" (1988). Talmy is working in the Cognitive Linguistics tradition
of Wittgenstein, Rosch, and Lakoff; like Jackendoff, he uses semantic fields
to infer central conceptual structure. At the time of this article, Talmy was
at the Institute for Cognitive Studies at Berkeley; this intellectual environment
appears to have been relatively insulated from the work of experimental psychologists
interested in domain specificity, although the two communities were in fact
developing similar and convergent models of cognition. Talmy and Jackendoff's
more recent work (cf. Talmy 1995)
reflects a growing familiarity with the psychological approaches to domain-specificity
The following presentation bases itself on Talmy's article. I do not
attempt to introduce his iconic notational system; for the purposes of
an orientation, a matrix seemed more accessible. I have also added a number
of examples. The presentation is schematic, reflecting the fact it was
designed as a series of overheads. For a summary of the significance of
the article for Cognitive Cultural Theory, see the conclusion.
Talmy's starting point is Cognitive Linguistics, and the observation
that certain notional categories are expressed by grammatical form, while
others are not. Number, gender, and time, for instance, are categories
frequently encountered in the syntactical structures of languages, while
color and temperature are not so utilized. Talmy argues that force dynamics--a
mode of construing the world in terms of entities interacting with respect
to force (49)--is a neglected semantic category, spanning across more semantic
fields than the more traditional "causative". His "systematic application
of force concepts to the organization of meaning in language" (50) aims
to demonstrate the pervasiveness of force-dynamics thinking.
Overview
Syntactical elements
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conjunctions
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although, because
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prepositions
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against, despite
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modals
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basic usage
epistemic usage
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Semantic fields
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physical force interactions
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psychological interactions
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social interactions
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argumentation and discourse
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Cognitive domains
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naïve physics
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folk psychology
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Cross-field generalizations
Semantic field
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Force-dynamics representation
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Physical
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The ball kept rolling along the green
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Physical/psychological
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John can't go out of the house
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Intra-psychological
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He refrained from closing the door
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Intra-psychological (lexicalized)
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She's civil to him
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Socio-psychological
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She gets to go to the park
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Force dynamics conceptual primitives
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two entities
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each exerts a force on the other
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one is foregrounded or singled out for focal attention (the "agonist")
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the other is considered for the effect it has on the agonist (the "antagonist")
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"an entity is taken to exert a force by virtue of an intrinsic tendency
towards manifesting it" (54)
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towards motion (action)
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towards rest (inaction)
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opposed forces have different relative strength
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"the entity that is able to manifest its tendency at the expense of its
opponent is the stronger" (54)
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"according to their relative strengths, the opposing forces yield a resultant"
(54)
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assessed only for the agonist
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action or inaction
Force dynamics categories
Category
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Prototypical
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Non-prototypical
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CAUSING
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onset causing of action
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onset causing of rest
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extended causing of action
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extended causing of rest
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LETTING
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onset letting of action
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onset letting of rest
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extended letting of action
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extended letting of rest
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Basic steady-state force-dynamic patterns
Force
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Greater
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The shed kept standing
despite the wind
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The ball kept rolling
despite the grass
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Lesser
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The ball kept rolling
because of the wind
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The log kept lying
because of the ridge
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Rest
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Motion
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Tendency
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Change-of-state
force-dynamic patterns
Force
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Greater
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The ball's hitting it
made the lamp fall
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The water's dripping on it
made the fire die down
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Lesser
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The stirring-rod's breaking
let the particles settle
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The plug's coming loose
let the water flow out
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Rest
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Motion
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Tendency
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Physical / psychological dynamics (agent
dynamics)
Force
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Greater
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They kept the rocks
from falling
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He struggled
against the wind
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Lesser
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They couldn't keep
the boat from sinking
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She got stuck
in the mud
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Rest
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Motion
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Tendency
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The Divided Self:
Internal Psychodynamics
Force
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Greater
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She refrained
from responding
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I forced myself
to keep working
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Lesser
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I couldn't keep myself
from falling asleep
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He was so ashamed
he couldn't open his mouth
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Rest
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Motion
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Tendency
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The natural state of the mind can be both activity and inactivity.
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Freud's model of the id, the ego, and the superego uses the preconceptual
structures of force dynamics
Extension of force dynamics
to social interactions
Force
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Greater
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He stayed even though
they asked him to leave
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He ordered me
to polish his boots
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Lesser
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He couldn't convince
her to come to the meeting
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I couldn't stop him
from telling her
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Rest
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Motion
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Tendency
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The
force-dynamics semantic field and cognitive domains
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"the conceptual models within linguistic organization have a striking similarity
to those evident in our naïve world conceptions" (91)
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the proper cognitive domain of force mechanics is objects; this has been
metaphorically extended to the actual domains of intentions and mental
states
Intuitive force dynamics versus
scientific notions of force
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construing force dynamics from the perspective of an agonist has no counterpart
in physics; equivalent objects have the same properties
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objects do not have an intrinsic force tendency towards action or rest,
but continue at their current velocity unless externally affected
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although differing amounts of force, measured as mass times velocity, are
in fact associated with objects, two interacting objects must nevertheless--and
counterintuitively--always be exerting an equal amount of force against
each other
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the semantic patterns "comprise a severely limited selection from the causal
actualities", omitting "particularities of rate, scope of involvement,
manner of spread, and the like" (92)
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"some of the most basic force--dynamic concepts-blocking and letting, resistance
and overcoming--have no principled counterpart in physics" (93)
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in the psychological domain, the metaphor of force dynamics "physicalizes"
the psychological and social realms
Conclusion
The main significance of Talmy's work in terms of cognitive cultural theory is
twofold. First of all, he is beginning to make the link between the conceptual
structures that emerge out of a study of cross-field generalizations in language
and cognitive domains. In the present case, he relates the semantic category "force
dynamics" to the cognitive domain "naive physics", provides a great list of conceptual
primitives, and points out that our intuitive notions of mechanics is erroneous
on almost all points with respect to scientifically formulated notions. Secondly,
he implies that while the basic notions of force dynamics are expressed in a range
of semantic fields, they originate in object mechanics. The application of conceptual
primitives, image schemas, and inference patterns from a source domain onto a
novel target domain is treated extensively in Lakoff
(1987) as the action of metaphor. Sperber's
(1994) treatment amounts to an extention of this scenario in two directions,
both of which appear compatible with Talmy's work. On the one hand, the source
domain is traced back to the environment in which humans evolved, where we can
look for a relevant proper domain for the development of the faculty in question
through a process of natural selection. On the other hand, the target domain is
seen to constitute a part of the current actual domain, of which the cultural
forms a special case. Talmy's most recent work is in fact in this field; cf. Talmy
(1995).
© 1996 Francis
F. Steen, Communication Studies, University of California, Los Angeles