|
Terrible News: [ We need to firm up the argument flow.] Abstract In the present paper, we document the type of errors committed by the major networks during and shortly after the attacks on September 11 and propose a psychologically based explanation for the phenomenon. Drawing on recent work in bias theory, we sketch out a framework for understanding and predicting the systematic occurrence of massive lapses in journalistic standards. Psychologists such as David Buss and Martie Haselton, adopting an evolutionary perspective on certain biases in human cognition, have proposed that some classes of interpretive bias may be the result of cognitive adaptations. In brief, they suggest that during long periods of human evolutionary history, it may have been advantageous for reproduction and survival systematically to bias one's interpretations of events in a certain direction. The underlying logic is that the costs of making a mistake is not symmetrical. Given that there is irreducable uncertainty in most situations, this logic suggests that there may have been a persistent adaptive pressure in favor of making mistakes in one rather than in the other direction. [Give examples.] Quick examples: wrong type of plane identified (737; commuter plane); fallacious news of State Department bombing; reporting of credible threat against AF1; attribution of attacks; estimated number of dead in attacks; number of missing planes; flight numbers of planes involved in each attack; recovery urban legends; "second wave" attack coverage; anthrax. Psychological bias theory has not previously been applied to news reporting. We would like to propose that such an application is appropriate, for the following reasons. The production of news faces the twin constraints of timeliness and accuracy, or more precisely, confident accuracy. Under a vast array of circumstances, these contraints are competing [characterize this relationship precisely]. A potential news item must first be detected by reporters, who obtain information either by actively looking for it or by being presented with it. Each piece of information must be subjected to the twin scrutiny of relevance and accuracy. It must then be formulated into a story, a process that takes some time and that involves interpretation and inference. Once conveyed to the editorial desk [term?], the editorial team must verify that journalistic standards have been adhered to and if necessary hold the story until the facts can be checked. As time passes by, the value of the story decreases; competing networks may already be going with the story, and the editorial desk may be put under pressure for sitting on it. On the other hand, by broadcasting a story that later turns out to be false, the editorial team puts the whole reputation of the news channel at stake. Accuracy does not simply mean that the information is correct, in some abstract and disembodied sense, as if seen by God's eye; more crucially, it means that the actual journalist has some systematic reason to be confident that it is correct. A rule of thumb is that a story should have at least two independent, credible sources. A great deal is at stake in this fact-checking. On the one hand, the major networks have established a position of credibility and authoritativeness in regards to news. This reputation is expensive and time-consuming to establish and represents a significant financial asset. The result of the competing pressures faced by a news room is that an increase in timeliness in the typical cases only be purchased at the expense of a decrease in confidence. We might want to take up the issue of how easily a network's news credibility can be eroded. One argument would be that the bandwidth commanded by the large networks represents such a massive position of informational power that deliberate misinformation can not only be presented initially but can be sustained indefinitely, since the truth can be systematically excluded. However, even this thesis requires the tacit or explicit collusion of all the major networks (this is Noam Chomsky's view of the media). Alternatively, unintantional mistakes may not be very damaging, as the sheer quantity of news is so high that most people are unable to track the accuracy of the news. The opposite perspective would be that false news will easily be detected, since there are several independent sources of news. Which of these accounts is most correct is likely a function of the type of news in question. What matters for our present purposes is that there is spectrum of ease of verifiability -- that is to say, the cost of verifying the accuracy of a news item varies by the type of news. At one end of the scale are events that take place far from the network audience, or at least far from the audience targeted by advertisers, whose viewing choices sustain the networks financially. Events that don't immediately affect these viewers often won't be subject to effectively correction. In the middle of the scale is the political or cultural framing of news -- the subject of political bias theories. At the other end of the scale is is physical events in the immediate environment of major metropolitan areas. Such events have numerous witnesses and a high degree of relevance in public discourse. When these conditions obtain, a news network would rapidly lose its reputation if it got the facts wrong. The point is that when it comes to domestic news of events witnessed by a large number of the people who constitute the core audience of the networks, we would under normal circumstances expect the networks to be strictly conscientious to get the stories right. The potential cost of making mistakes could be very high. End of this strain of the argument -- the point is to suggest that the networks were making mistakes in areas where they should be the most keen to avoid them, because they are the most likely to be caught out. We would therefore in general predict that networks should apply espcially strict requirements of confidence for these types of news stories. A second topic we might want to address is the size of the news channel. Any piece of news, any story, must also be competitively against other potential news stories for space in the tightly constrained channel of news. This constraint works together with the constraints of timeliness and confidence to increase the pressure. We should remark on the remarkable solution that nearly all the media channels adopted during the September 11 attack: they vastly expanded coverage. This raises two issues: the costs (massive loss in advertising revenue) and the benefits (increase in credibility or social capital?). I'm just sketching now. Competing hypothesis: Rapidly-developing stories will always have their share of potential errors because observers on the ground aren't likely to be able to see whole story. These potential errors are realized when competitive pressure to be first with the story overwhelm regular news judgement. Difficult example for us: News coverage of the released of the Supreme Court decision in Bush/Gore 2000. While not a situation of life-and-death, news organizations went live to reporters who did not understand and had not read the decision. Several news organizations made incorrect assertions about the content of the decision (Gore victory, etc.). But news organizations hate getting stories visibly wrong more than they hate being "late" (news axiom "Get it first, but first get it second.). And these sorts of errors are highly visible. Public demand for this potentially inaccurate news might also fluctuate depending on perceived importance (threat). Public might shift standards. Now, some material on the logic of communication. First, discuss the irreduceable uncertainty inherent in news gathering. It cannot be eliminated. What we are left with is a tradeoff between timeliness and confidence, as outlined above -- we should beef up that discussion. Now here's a twist: faced with the pressure of timeliness and confidence, one possible solution is to decrease the pressure by increasing the channel. This is an effect we should take into account and provide an explanation for. In short, the idea is that confidence can be lowered and timeliness increased. The question is whether this can happen simply because the channel is widened, or more importantly because of the psychological bias we're proposing. So let's get to it. Applied to news reporting, psychological bias theory predicts that there will be a consistent tendency of reporters -- editors, producers, reporters -- to perform an implied evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of the [spell this out]. And to be risk-averse, overly-cautious. Fit with Kahneman and Tversky-type findings in psych about over-valuing losses vs. gains. Observed at individual level, but not applied to predictable occurrences in mass media. Also fits with tendency to overstate risks in news that have been attributed to sensationalism and pandering. Broader human behavior in time of crisis: E-mailed warnings; warnings by public officials (Davis, Ashcroft), etc., that err on side of caution to the detriment of society or the actual public interest. Issues: Baseline of "normal" correct coverage. Parallelism of mistakes might be due to simultaneous acquisition of info. Psychological bias theory provides a powerful theoretical framework, we suggest, for understanding the lapse in accepted standards of journalism during a crisis. The bias at stake is of course a very different phenomenon from the types of bias typically discussed in relation to media politics, such as a liberal or conservative bias in reporting. We don't mean to minimize the significance of such political or cultural bias. Although it does not play a pivotal role in the phenomenon we are addressing in the current article, political bias is a component factor. [Spell this out.] The idea is that, under pressure, there may be a tendency to assign causes to events in ways that are driven by preexisting and easily accessible interpretive schemas. We may or may not want to pursue this tack; perhaps something else of use could be said about political bias theory and its relation to our applicaation of psychological bias theory. It must be emphasized that the label "adaptive" does not mean and is not intended to signify that this behavior is somehow helpful, that it serves an important purpose, or that it solves a genuine problem. Quite on the contrary, we would like to argue that a lapse in journalistic standards during frightening or decisively important events is highly damaging. Moreover, it seems to us that terror is precisely the intentional targeting or exploitation of this cognitive bias. The harm inflicted by terrorists directly, however horrendous, is typically limited. Most of the ill effects of terror are self-inflicted, and follow directly as a consequence of a bias towards risk aversion. Of course, such a bias, if we are right, does not express itself merely in news reporting. It plays an important role in other aspects of running a modern society. News reporting, however, because it provides much of the information on which distributed decisions are based, carries a special responsibility to get its stories right. Terrorist incentive: Barring use of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist threat intended to produce over-estimation of any one person's liklihood of being involved in terrorist acts. 9/11 was nasty and horrible, but in terms of physical and human toll, limited. Financial after-effects and changes in behavior were massive [UCI economist Peter Navarro]. If people weighed probability of being attacked "correctly," it would be blip compared to car accidents or cancer. Type of coverage received magnifies effect. [Thought experiment: Imagine effects of similar loss of life if separated more by time and viewing: Titanic and Maine sinkings might be bad example, but immediacy of coverage on TV magnified effectiveness of terrorist attack by allowing easier empathy and perceived self-threat.] People in Los Angeles highrises on Wilshire evacuating their buildings. People in Bunche Hall nervously eyeing planes. Every flu becomes anthrax.
|
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
